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ABSTRACT	   Throughout	   the	   years	   the	   overwhelming	   preponderance	   of	   US	   global	  
leadership	   is	   debated	   by	   scholars	   and	   politicians.	   In	   light	   of	   the	   'rise	   of	   the	   rest',	   this	  
preponderance	   is	   either	   diminishing	   or	   still	   standing.	   As	   of	   now,	   yet	   again,	   the	   US	   is	   a	  
dominant	  player	  both	  economically	  and	  militarily.	  However,	  economic	  recession	   is	   likely	  to	  
make	   the	   United	   States	   put	  more	   emphasis	   on	   domestic	   problems	   and	   less	   emphasis	   on	  
foreign	  challenges.	  Since	  political	  and	  economic	  landscape	  is	  swiftly	  changing	  overseas,	  the	  
United	  States	  should	  act	  accordingly	  and	  cooperate	  with	  regional	  powers	  on	  issues	  of	  mutual	  
interest.	  Similarly,	  as	  current	  development	  is	  under	  way	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  the	  United	  States	  




Whether	  the	  U.S.	  leadership	  is	  growing	  or	  
diminishing	   is	   still	   debated	   in	   academics	  
and	   politics,	   at	   home	   and	   abroad.	   From	  
1987	   onward,	   starting	   from	   Paul	  
Kennedy1,	   many	   scholars	   embrace	   the	  
idea	   that	   the	   United	   States	   is	   steadily	   in	  
decline,	   whereas	   others	   argue	   that	   the	  
attribution	   of	   utter	   decline	   to	   “imperial	  
overstretch”,	  “relative	  decline”	  as	  the	  rise	  
of	   the	   rest,	   and	   “absolute	   decline”	   (Nye,	  
2011,	  p.	  156)	  is	  not	  new	  and	  thus,	  to	  some	  
extent,	  far-­‐fetched.	  
                                            
1	   For	   the	   first	   time,	   Paul	   Kennedy	   coined	   this	  
phrase	  in	  his	  famous	  book	  “The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  
Great	  Powers”,	  1989.	  	  
	  
Aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  United	  Sta-­‐
tes	   enjoyed	   its	   drastic	   economic	   growth	  
and	   a	   predominant	   role	   in	   stretching	   its	  
influence	  from	  Latin	  America	  to	  South	  East	  
Asia.	   In	   addition,	   the	   Cold	   War	   provided	  
the	   U.S.	   with	   an	   enormous	   impetus	   to	  
form	  alliances	  and	  fight	  against	  the	  adver-­‐
sary	   in	  different	   fronts.	  After	   the	   triumph	  
over	   communism,	   albeit	   not	   often,	   the	  
United	   States	   proceeded	   to	   exercise	   its	  
Cold	   War	   strategy	   and	   rhetoric.	   In	   the	  
meantime,	   the	   United	   States	   tended	   to	  
underestimate	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  emerging	  
political	  and	  economic	  landscape	  with	  the	  
sweeping	   effect	   of	   globalization	   on	  
nations	   around	   the	   globe.	   After	   the	  
demise	  of	   the	   Soviet	  Union,	   although	   the	  
Clinton	  administration	  partially	  succeeded	  
in	  establishing	  the	  U.S.	  leadership	  through	  
cooperation	   and	   engagement,	   the	   eight-­‐



























year	   Bush	   Administration,	   notably	   the	  
“war	  on	  terror”	  brought	  it	  to	  the	  Cold	  War	  
nadir.	   Dividing	   the	   world	   into	   two	   fronts	  
and	  preaching,	   “you	  are	  either	  with	  us	  or	  
against	   us”,	   generated	  hatred	   and	   venge-­‐
ance	  across	  the	  globe.	  From	  2000	  to	  2007,	  
there	  was	   a	   remarkably	   growing	   trend	   of	  
apprehension	   on	   the	   United	   States	   even	  
among	   the	   public	   of	   traditional	   NATO	  
allies.2	  	  
Apart	  from	  politics,	  the	  American	  model	  is	  
no	   longer	   appealing	   to	  outsiders.	  As	  Ken-­‐
neth	  Rogoff,	  a	  Harvard	  economist,	  puts	  it:	  
“.	   .	   .	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world	   is	   no	   longer	  
willing	  to	  sit	  quietly	  and	  be	  lectured	  by	  the	  
United	   States	   .	   .	   .”	   (The	  
New	   York	   Times,	   2009).	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   U.S.	   still	  
holds	   its	   primacy	   in	   world	  
affairs.	   Both	   economically	  
and	   militarily,	   the	   U.S.	   is	  
yet	   again	   a	   dominant	  
player.	   Another	   spectrum	  
of	  the	  debate	  encompasses	  
the	   future	   of	   American	  
power	   in	   light	   of	   “the	   rise	  
of	  the	  rest”	  (Zakaria,	  2008).	  
Some	  of	  the	  noted	  scholars	  
question	   whether	   America	  
will	   be	   holding	   its	   primacy	  
in	  the	  new	  world.	  To	  elaborate,	  the	  paper	  
will	  present	  two	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  
the	  United	  State’s	  ability	  to	  sustain	  its	  role	  
as	   a	   global	   leader	   and	   two	   factors	   that	  
weaken	  its	  ability	  to	  play	  a	  leadership	  role	  
in	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  
Optimistic Views 
To	   begin	   with	   an	   optimistic	   view,	   the	  
United	   States	   will	   sustain	   its	   role	   as	   a	  
global	   leader	   thanks	   to	   its	   economic	  
                                            
2	   For	   detailed	   information,	   see	   Steven	   Hook	   and	  
John	  Spanier	  “American	  Foreign	  Policy	  Since	  World	  
War	  II”,	  18th	  ed.,	  2010,	  p.	  348.	  	  
strength,	   military	   power	   and	   institutional	  
capacity.	   For	   the	   last	   60	   years,	   the	   U.S.	  
made	  enormous	  breakthrough	   in	  building	  
financial	   institutions,	   strengthening	  NATO	  
and	   overseeing	   the	   global	   market.	  
Although,	   as	   of	   now,	   it	   suffers	   from	   the	  
economic	   recession,	   its	   “output	   still	  
amounts	   to	   roughly	   one-­‐quarter	   of	   the	  
world	   total,	   and	   its	   military	   spending	  
exceeds	   that	   of	   all	   other	   countries	   com-­‐
bined”	   (Hook,	   2010,	   p.	   348).	   Apart	   from	  
that	  military	  expenditure	  in	  light	  of	  recent	  
wars	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   Iraq,	   which	   is	  
regarded	   as	   the	   accumulation	   of	   national	  
debt,	  in	  fact	  did	  not	  exceed	  one	  percent	  of	  
GDP	   as	   opposed	   to	  
Vietnam	   War	   which	  
accounted	  for	  “.	  .	  .	  1.6	  per-­‐
cent	   of	   American	   GDP	   in	  
1970	  .	  .	  ."	  (Zakaria,	  2011,	  p.	  
199).	   Similarly,	   Robert	  
Kagan	   argues	   that	   the	  U.S.	  
deployed	  more	   troops	   and	  
invested	  more	  resources	   in	  
1950s	   and	   1960s,	   for	  
military	   expenditure	   can-­‐
not	  be	  attributed	  “.	   .	   .	  as	  a	  
major	   contributor	   to	   the	  
soaring	   fiscal	   deficits	   that	  
threaten	   the	   solvency	   of	  
the	   national	   economy”	  
(Kagan,	   2012,	   p.	   128).	   As	   an	   elaboration,	  
he	   points	   out	   that	   “even	   the	   most	  
draconian	   cuts	   in	   the	   defense	   budget	  
would	  produce	  annual	  savings	  of	  only	  $50	  
billion	   to	   $100	   billion,	   a	   small	   fraction	   –	  
between	   4	   and	   8	   percent	   –	   of	   the	   $1.5	  
trillion	  in	  annual	  deficits	  the	  United	  States	  
is	  facing”	  (Kagan,	  2012,	  p.	  129).	  
Furthermore,	   recently	   a	   number	   of	  
scholars	   and	   politicians	   echo	   rising	   China	  
and	   its	  repercussion	  for	  the	  United	  States	  
in	  the	  years	  to	  come.	  The	  belief	  that	  China	  
will	   soon	   exceed	   the	   U.S.	   in	   terms	   of	  
economic	   growth	   is	   highly	   far-­‐fetched.	   In	  
today’s	   growth	   rate,	   China	   should	   spend	  
To	  begin	  with	  an	  optimistic	  
view,	  the	  United	  States	  will	  
sustain	  its	  role	  as	  a	  global	  
leader	  thanks	  to	  its	  
economic	  strength,	  military	  
power	  and	  institutional	  
capacity.	  For	  the	  last	  60	  
years,	  the	  U.S.	  made	  
enormous	  breakthrough	  in	  
building	  financial	  
institutions,	  strengthening	  
NATO	  and	  overseeing	  the	  
global	  market. 



























two	   decades	   to	   reach	   the	   U.S.	   economic	  
level.	  Chinese	  income	  per	  capita	  is	  roughly	  
$7,400,	   whereas	   the	   U.S.	   income	   per	  
capita	  exceeds	  that	  of	  Chinese	  almost	  four	  
times,	  containing	  $28.500.	  Militarily,	  China	  
would	  need	  approximately	  the	  same	  time	  
span	   to	   level	   the	   U.S.	   military	   might	  
(Etzioni,	  2012,	  p.	  63).	  
Similarly,	   in	   light	   of	   rising	   China,	   it	   is	   still	  
debated	   whether	   economic	   power	   signi-­‐
fies	   military	   power.	   Joseph	   Nye	   argues	  
that	   “the	   United	   States	   was	   the	   world’s	  
largest	   economy	   for	   70	   years	   before	   it	  
became	   a	   military	   superpower”	   (Nye,	  
2011).	  Hence	  he	  casts	  his	  doubt	  that	  “geo-­‐
economics”	   had	   indeed	   replaced	   geo-­‐
politics.	  “Military	  power	   .	  
.	   .	   requires	   a	   thriving	  
economy.	   But	   whether	  
economic	   or	   military	   re-­‐
sources	   produce	   more	  
power	   in	   today’s	   world	  
depends	   on	   the	   context”	  
(Nye,	   2011).	   Nye	   points	  
out	   that	   both	   economic	  
and	   military	   power	   are	   of	   paramount	  
importance,	   referring	   to	   Obama’s	   Nobel	  
Prize	   speech	   “There	   will	   be	   times	   when	  
nations	  –	  acting	  individually	  or	  in	  concert	  –	  
will	   find	   the	   use	   of	   force	   not	   only	  
necessary	  but	  morally	  justified.”	  	  
The	   second	   factor	   that	   will	   contribute	   to	  
the	  U.S.	  leadership	  is	  a	  strategic	  necessity.	  
Even	   though	   regional	   powers	   emerge	   in	  
different	  continents,	  the	  United	  States	  will	  
be	   holding	   its	   primacy	   since	   regional	  
powers	  still	  lack	  a	  capacity	  to	  play	  this	  role	  
and	   thereby	   will	   want	   the	   U.S.	   presence.	  
However,	  this	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  manifest-­‐
ted	  in	  a	  non-­‐traditional	  pattern	  –	  no	  impo-­‐
sition	   and	   coercion,	   but	   cooperation.	  
Evidently,	  this	  will	  also	  benefit	  the	  United	  
States	  since	  it	  cannot	  deal	  with	  the	  global	  
challenges	  alone.	  As	   former	  Senator	  Oba-­‐
ma	   made	   it	   clear	   in	   his	   2007	   Foreign	  
Affairs	   piece	   that	   “America	   cannot	   meet	  
this	   century’s	   challenges	  alone;	   the	  world	  
cannot	   meet	   them	   without	   America”	  
(Obama,	   2007).	   To	   elaborate,	   he	   retro-­‐
spectively	   analyzed	   the	   need	   for	   America	  
around	   the	   globe	   and	   the	   breakthrough	  
the	   United	   States	  made	   thus	   far,	   spelling	  
out	  “today,	  we	  are	  again	  called	  to	  provide	  
visionary	  leadership”	  (Obama,	  2007).	  
Nevertheless,	   interests	  of	  major	  countries	  
are	   namely	   compatible	   than	   competitive	  
in	   the	   new	   world.	   Rigid	   communist	   and	  
non-­‐communist	   blocs	   do	   not	   exist	   any	  
longer.	   Relatively,	   most	   countries	   share	  
the	   same	   values,	   such	   as	   democracy,	  
human	   rights,	   peace,	   and	   free	   market.	  
However,	   what	   the	   U.S.	   is	   not	   keen	   to	  
digest	   is	   to	   accept	   the	  
reality	   –	   emergence	   of	  
different	   powers	   around	  
the	   globe.	   The	   only	  
survival	   for	   the	   United	  
States	   is	   to	   cooperate	  
with	   every	   single	   power	  
on	   issues	   of	   mutual	  
interests,	   and	   promote	  
peace	  and	  security	  at	  home	  and	  overseas.	  
The	  Cold	  War	  way	  of	  conduct	  is	  no	  longer	  
efficient.	   Nor	   does	   it	   yield	   any	   counter-­‐
balancing	  result.	  Even	  in	  1990s	  Huntington	  
predicted	   that	   “neither	   globalism	   nor	  
isolationism,	   neither	   multiculturalism	   nor	  
unilateralism	   will	   best	   serve	   American	  
interests”	   (Huntington,	   1996).	   Similarly,	  
today	   Krauthammer	   argues	   that	   “the	  
danger	   of	   democratic	   globalism	   is	   its	  
universalism,	  its	  open-­‐ended	  commitment	  
to	  human	  freedom,	  its	  temptation	  to	  plant	  
the	   flag	   of	   democracy	   everywhere.”	  
Hence,	   he	   calls	   for	   “democratic	   realism”,	  
whereby	   “we	   [the	   United	   States]	   will	  
support	   democracy	   everywhere,	   but	   we	  
will	   commit	   blood	   and	   treasure	   only	   in	  
places	  where	  there	  is	  a	  strategic	  necessity	  
–	  meaning,	  places	  central	  to	  the	  larger	  war	  
against	   the	   existential	   enemy,	   the	   enemy	  
Even	  though	  regional	  powers	  
emerge	  in	  different	  continents,	  
the	  United	  States	  will	  be	  holding	  
its	  primacy	  since	  regional	  powers	  
still	  lack	  a	  capacity	  to	  play	  this	  
role	  and	  thereby	  will	  want	  the	  
U.S.	  presence. 



























that	   poses	   a	   global	   mortal	   threat	   to	  
freedom”	  	  (Krauthammer,	  2004).	  
Pessimistic Views 
Whereas	   the	   pessimistic	   view	   is	   that	   the	  
U.S.	   vision	   and	   strategy	   are	   outdated.	  
Twenty	  first	  century	  will	  not	  mark	  a	  rivalry	  
of	   ideologies,	   but	   interests,	   not	   territorial	  
expansion,	   but	   acquisition	   of	   resources.	  
Failure	  in	  Iraq	  raised	  many	  questions	  with	  
regard	   to	   the	   necessity	  
and	   efficiency	   of	   the	  
war.	   From	   preparation	  
to	   implementation	   of	  
the	   “war	   on	   terror”,	  
there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  
fatal	   flaws.	   Many	   argue	  
that	   the	   Iraq	   and	  
Afghanistan	   wars	   were	  
redundant	   and	   too	  
costly.	  Even	  2011	  Senate	  Foreign	  Relations	  
Committee	  report	  indicates	  that	  “much	  of	  
the	   aid	   to	   Afghanistan	   was	   wasted	   or	  
remains	   unaccounted	   for,	   and	   the	  
money’s	   positive	   effects	   were	   short-­‐lived	  
and	  distorted	  the	  Afghan	  economy,	  polity	  
and	  society"	  (Etzioni,	  2012,	  p.	  60).	  
Worst	   of	   all,	   failure	   in	   Iraq	   and	   Afghanis-­‐
tan	   will	   better	   serve	   Iran	   and	   other	   “un-­‐
friendly”	   countries	   to	   further	   their	   inte-­‐
rests	  in	  the	  region	  and	  bring	  anti-­‐American	  
forces	   to	   an	   alliance.	   It	   seems	   that	   “the	  
mission	  is	  accomplished”	  for	  them.	  	  
Bush’s	  “freedom	  agenda”	  outlined	  that	  “it	  
is	   the	   policy	   of	   the	  United	   States	   to	   seek	  
and	  support	   the	  growth	  of	  democratic	   in-­‐
stitutions	  in	  every	  nation	  and	  culture,	  with	  
the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  ending	  tyranny	  in	  our	  
world”	   (Bush,	   2005).	   As	   Lindsay	   observed	  
“democracy	   promotion	   often	   conflicted	  
with	   other	   important	   U.S.	   foreign	   policy	  
goals,	  most	  notably	  countering	  terrorism”	  
(Lindsay,	   2011,	   p.	   770).	   Cooperation	   on	  
terrorism	   outweighed	   the	   significance	   of	  
the	   U.S.	   pressure	   on	   autocratic	   govern-­‐
ments	   to	   implement	   democratic	   reforms.	  
Further,	   as	   Lindsay	   argues,	   “democracy	  
could	  produce	  governments	  hostile	  to	  U.S.	  
interests”	   (Lindsay,	   2011,	   p.	   770).	   Hamas	  
coming	   to	   power	   changed	   the	   discourse	  
and	  challenged	  the	  “freedom	  agenda”.	  On	  
the	   eve	   of	   the	   Arab	   Awakening,	   the	   U.S.	  
backed	   Mubarak	   virtually	   until	   after	   he	  
was	   toppled	   down.	   Evidently,	   democracy	  
and	   human	   rights	   were	   and	   still	   are	  
manipulated	   to	   meet	   certain	   ends.	   In	  
retrospect,	   Huntington	  
observed	   that	   “demo-­‐
cracy	   is	   promoted,	   but	  
not	   if	   it	   brings	   Islamic	  
fundamentalists	   to	  
power;	   nonprolifera-­‐
tion	   is	   preached	   for	  
Iran	   and	   Iraq,	   but	   not	  
for	   Israel;	   free	   trade	   is	  
the	   elixir	   of	   economic	  
growth,	   but	   not	   for	   agriculture;	   human	  
rights	  are	  an	  issue	  with	  China,	  but	  not	  with	  
Saudi	   Arabia;	   aggression	   against	   oil-­‐
owning	   Kuwaitis	   is	   repulsed	  with	  massive	  
force,	   but	   not	   so	   aggression	   against	   oil-­‐
less	  Bosnians	  .	  .	  .”	  (Huntington,	  1996).	  
The	   Department	   of	   Defense’s	   recently	  
released	   strategy	   “Sustaining	   U.S.	   Global	  
Leadership:	   Priorities	   for	   21th	   Century	  
Defense”	   states	   that	   “our	   [U.S.’s]	   global	  
responsibilities	   are	   significant;	   we	   cannot	  
afford	   to	   fail.”	   However,	   Paul	   Kennedy	  
argued	   more	   than	   two	   decades	   ago	   that	  
“imperial	   overstretch”,	   whereby	   military	  
expenditure	  was	  exceedingly	   increasing	  in	  
light	  of	   the	  Vietnam	  war,	  puts	  America	  at	  
peril.	   In	   this	   regard,	   the	   second	   flaw	   is	  
associated	   with	   excessive	   confidence	   on	  
unilateral	   approach	   and	   ignorance	   of	  
global	   support,	   which	   showed	   that	   even	  
American	   economic	   and	   military	   super-­‐
power	  is	  thus	  far	  incapable	  of	  overcoming	  
terrorism.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   is	   a	   costly	  
failure.	  Instead,	  the	  U.S.	  should	  revamp	  its	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mission	  and	  revise	  its	  conventional	  strate-­‐
gy	   based	   on	   rivalry.	   As	   Kupchan	   et	   al.	  
suggest,	   the	   U.S.	   should	   “encourage	  
others	   to	   assume	   a	   larger	   geopolitical	  
role”	  (Kupchan	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  p.	  42).	  
Democrats	   agree	   that	   “excessive	   use	   of	  
force	   creates	   an	   anti-­‐American	   sentiment	  
and	   encourages	   terrorism”	   (Kupchan	   et	  
al.,	   2007,	   p.	   39).	   Thus,	  most	   people	   echo	  
that	   the	   United	   States	   should	   not	   get	  
involved	   in	   tackling	   energy-­‐consuming	  
global	  problems.	  Like	  the	  Vietnam	  syndro-­‐
me	   and	   apprehension,	   the	   recent	   poll	  
shows	   that	   72	   percent	   of	   the	   American	  
young	   believe	   that	   the	   U.S.	   should	   not	  
“take	   the	   lead	   in	   solving	   global	   crisis”	  
(Kupchan	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  p.	  40).	  
In	   light	   of	   the	   “war	   on	   terror”,	   the	   U.S.	  
aspiration	   to	   oust	   authoritarian	   regimes	  
and	   eradicate	   terrorism,	   thus	   far,	   did	   not	  
yield	   an	   expected	   result	   in	   terms	   of	  
dealing	  with	   radicalization	   in	  general,	  and	  
uprooting	   terrorism	   in	   particular.	   Impor-­‐
ting	   democracy	   to	   Afghanistan	   and	   Iraq	  
brought	  about	   turmoil	   in	  political	   system,	  
disaster	   to	   social	   cohesion	   and	   schism	   to	  
communal	  and	  religious	  diversity.	  
As	   of	   now,	   anti-­‐American	   sentiment	   is	  
increasing	  and	  is	  mainly	  manifested	  in	  the	  
idea	   that	   “the	   West’s	   responsibility	   is	   to	  
secure	   its	   own	   interests,	   not	   to	   promote	  
those	  of	   other	  peoples	  nor	   to	   attempt	   to	  
settle	   conflicts	   between	   other	   peoples	  
when	   those	   conflicts	   are	   of	   little	   or	   no	  
consequence	   to	   the	  West”	  
(Huntington,	   1996).	   The	  
long-­‐lasting	   belief	   that	  
“culture	  of	  the	  West	  is	  and	  
ought	   to	   be	   the	   culture	   of	  
the	   world”	   failed	   and	  
“Coca-­‐colonization”	  did	  not	  
transform	   Oriental	   values	  
into	   Occidental	   ones.	   As	   Huntington	   puts	  
it:	   “China	   is	   clearly	   modernizing,	   but	  
certainly	   not	   westernizing”	   (Huntington,	  
1996).	   For	   the	   economic	   boom,	   East	  
Asians	  believe	  that	  they	  owe	  to	  their	  own	  
values	  they	  adhere	  to,	  not	  Western	  values	  
that	  are	  subliminally	  imported.	  Huntington	  
elaborates	  that	  Asians	  perceive	  that	  “what	  
is	  universalism	  to	   the	  West	   is	   imperialism	  
to	  the	  rest”	  (Huntington,	  1996).	  
The	   question	   is	   not	   whether	   U.S.	   as	   an	  
imperial	   power	   will	   collapse	   or	   not,	   but	  
whether	  U.S.	  will	  sustain	   its	  unipolar	  role.	  
Stephen	   Walt	   argues	   that	   the	   “unipolar	  
moment”	   is	   about	   to	  end.	  Hence,	  we	  will	  
observe	   “either	   a	   bipolar	   Sino-­‐American	  
rivalry	   or	   a	   multipolar	   system	   containing	  
several	   unequal	   great	   powers”	   (S.	   Walt,	  
2011,	  p.	  4).	  Oddly	  enough,	  the	  DoD's	  21th	  
century	   priority	   paper	   only	   now	   empha-­‐
sizes	  the	  need	  to	  assess	  “the	  U.S.	  defense	  
strategy	  in	   light	  of	  the	  changing	  geopoliti-­‐
cal	   environment	   and	   changing	   fiscal	  
circumstances”	   (Department	   of	   Defense,	  
2012).	  
With	   the	   President	   Obama	   in	   power	   and	  
daunting	   tasks	   on	   the	   table,	   shift	   in	   the	  
course	   is	   visible.	   When	   President	   Obama	  
attended	   G-­‐20	   summit	   in	   London	   as	   part	  
of	  his	  official	  visit	  three	  years	  ago,	  Robert	  
Gibbs,	   the	  White	   House	   spokesman,	   said	  
that	   the	   President	   “is	   going	   to	   listen	   in	  
London,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  lead”	  (The	  New	  York	  
Times,	  2009).	  Obama	  observed	  that	   if	   the	  
United	   States	   emphasized	   common	   inte-­‐
rests	   “at	   the	   margins,	   they	   [other	  
countries]	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   want	   to	  
cooperate	   than	   not	   cooperate”	   (Lindsay,	  
2011,	   p.	   778).	   Obama’s	  
advisor	   called	   it	   “leading	  
from	   behind”.	   New	   York	  
Times	   depicted	   the	   overall	  
picture	   as	   the	   following:	  
“The	   challenges	   stem	   in	  
part	   from	   lingering	   un-­‐
happiness	   around	   the	  
world	  at	   the	  way	  the	  Bush	  administration	  
used	  American	  power.	  But	  they	  have	  been	  
made	  more	   intense	  by	   the	  sense	   in	  many	  
capitals	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  no	  longer	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in	  any	  position	  to	  dictate	  to	  other	  nations	  
what	  types	  of	  economic	  policies	  to	  pursue	  
—	  or	  to	  impose	  its	  will	  more	  generally	  as	  it	  
intensifies	   the	   war	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	  
extracts	   itself	   from	   Iraq”	   (The	   New	   York	  
Times,	  2009).	  
Likewise,	   having	   understood	   the	   regional	  
shift	  in	  power	  dynamics,	  the	  United	  States	  
tends	   to	   see	   Latin	   America	   as	   a	   self-­‐
sustaining	   region.	   Hence,	   in	   April	   2009,	  
Washington’s	   Latin	   America	   policy	  
emphasized	  mutual	  respect	  and	  outlined	  a	  
vision	   of	   equal	   partnerships	   and	   joint	  
responsibility	   (Crandall,	   2011,	   p.	   83).	  
Similarly,	   current	   developments	   in	   the	  
Greater	   Middle	   East,	   notably	   growing	  
unrest	   in	   Syria	   and	   shackled	   nuclear	  
program	  of	   Iran	  steadily	   increase	  Turkey’s	  
regional	   weight	   to	   overcome	   regional	  
challenges	  of	  global	  impact.	  	  	  
Conclusion 
In	  retrospect,	  it	  is	  generally	  argued	  that	  as	  
the	  sole	  power	  the	  Bush’s	  “war	  on	  terror”	  
proved	   that	   American	   power	   is	   incapable	  
of	   tackling	   enormous	   challenges	   beyond	  
its	   border.	   Unlike	   Bush,	   Obama	  
understands	   these	   challenges,	   and	  
preaches	   that	   “navigating	   this	   more	  
complex	  world	  required	  listening	  to	  others	  
and	   giving	   them	  a	   stake	   in	   upholding	   the	  
international	   order”	   (Lindsay,	   2011,	   p.	  
778).	   However,	   Lindsay	   suspects	   that	  
“more	   cooperation”	   with	   others	   would	  
lead	   to	   “enough	   cooperation”	   for	   the	  
United	   States.	   Hence,	   the	   U.S.	   concern	  
should	   not	   be	   whether	   it	   will	   lose	   its	  
leadership	   role	   in	   the	   years	   to	   come.	  
Rather,	   as	   Lindsay	   observes,	   the	   concern	  
should	  be	  “how	  to	  promote	  U.S.	   interests	  
in	  a	  world	  that	  often	  will	  not	  automatically	  
respond	   to	   U.S.	   leadership	   even	   as	   the	  
United	   States	   remains	   the	   single	   most	  
powerful	  and	  influential	  country”	  (Lindsay,	  
2011,	  p.	  779).	  By	  and	  large,	  most	  countries	  
of	   the	   new	   world	   welcome	   the	   U.S.	  
leadership,	   albeit	   diminishing,	   in	   dealing	  
with	   global	   challenges.	   Even	   the	   recent	  
Libya	   operations	   showed	   that	   U.S.’s	  
“preponderance	   of	   power”	   cannot	   be	  
excluded	   since	   “they	   [European	   NATO	  
allies]	  were	  neither	  accustomed	  to	  leading	  
nor	   necessarily	   capable	   of	   it”	   (Lindsay,	  
2011,	   p.	   779).	   However,	   Lindsay	   warns	  
that	   “unless	   Obama	   finds	   a	   way	   to	   align	  
his	   foreign	   policy	   prescriptions	   with	  
evolving	   global	   trends,	   the	   gap	   between	  
American	   aspirations	   and	  
accomplishments	   will	   grow,	   and	   the	  
prospects	   for	   successful	   U.S.	   global	  
leadership	   will	   dim	   further”	   (Lindsay,	  
2011,	  p.	  779).	  	  
Regardless	   of	   the	   affiliation	   of	   the	   next	  
U.S.	  President,	  he	  will	  definitely	  choose	  to	  
invest	   more	   time	   on	   domestic	   problems	  
and	   less	   time	   on	   challenges	   in	  
international	   affairs.	   Not	   surprisingly,	  
along	   with	   the	   emphasis	   on	   decline	   of	  
American	  leadership	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come,	  
the	  National	   Intelligence	  Council’s	  “Global	  
Trends	  2025:	  A	  Transformed	  World”	  paper	  
highlights	   a	   similar	   projection	   “Shrinking	  
economic	   and	   military	   capabilities	   may	  
force	   the	   U.S.	   into	   a	   difficult	   set	   of	  
tradeoffs	   between	   domestic	   versus	  
foreign	   policy	   priorities”	   (National	  
Intelligence	  Council,	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  
Hence,	   since	   the	   political	   and	   economic	  
landscape	   is	   swiftly	   changing,	   the	   United	  
States	  should	  change	  its	  Cold	  War	  rhetoric	  
and	   revamp	   its	   outdated	   strategy,	   and	  
cooperate	  with	   regional	  powers	  on	   issues	  
of	  mutual	  interest.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  United	  
States	   should	   not	   necessarily	   utilize	   its	  
hard	  power,	  but	  soft	  power	  to	  collaborate	  
with	   regional	   powers	   and	   emerging	  
markets.	   In	   addition,	   since	   the	   United	  
States	   is	   expected	   to	   lag	   behind	  
economically	  and	  militarily	   in	  the	  years	  to	  
come,	   it	   is	  more	   than	   reasonable	   for	   the	  



























United	   States	   to	   avoid	   unilateral	   action	  
and	   embrace	   global	   support.	   Only	   will	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